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Abstract
Agricultural nonpoint pollution is inherently stochastic (e.g., due to weather).  In theory, this randomness
has implications for the choice and design of policy instruments.  However, very few empirical studies have
modeled natural variability.  This paper investigates the importance of stochastic processes for the choice
and design of alternative nonpoint instruments. The findings suggest that not explicitly considering the
stochastic processes in the analysis can produce significantly biased results.
Copyright 2000 by Richard Horan, Roger Claassen, and Joseph Cooper.  All rights reserved.  Readers may
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commerical purposes by any means, provided that this
copyright notice appears on all such copies.1
Introduction
Agricultural nonpoint source pollution, especially nutrient runoff, is a major source of many
remaining U.S. water quality problems (USEPA and USDA, 1998).  As efforts to control these sources are
beginning to take shape (USEPA and USDA, 1998; Ribaudo, Horan, and Smith, 1999), there is a growing
need for economic analysis that can guide the selection and design of policy instruments.  However, the
existing literature on the relative efficiency of alternative nonpoint pollution control instruments (e.g.,
Helfand and House, 1995; Larson, Helfand, and House, 1996; Flemming and Adams, 1997; Moxey and
White, 1992; Shortle, Horan, and Abler, 1998; Claassen and Horan, forthcoming; Horan et al., 1999;
Hopkins, Schnitkey, and Tweeten, 1996; Taylor, Adams, and Miller, 1992; Huang, Shank, and Hewitt, 1996;
Mapp et al., 1994) is still far from a consensus on what types of instruments represent good economic
policies (Shortle, Horan, and Abler, 1998).
One reason for these mixed economic results may be, at least in part, a lack of convention in how
nonpoint pollution problems are modeled empirically.  Nonpoint problems are characterized by several
important features, such as stochastic and unobservable emissions, significant heterogeneity in environmental
impacts and large numbers of polluters (Braden and Segerson, 1993; Shortle and Abler, 1997).  However,
different studies account for these features differently.  This lack of convention is troublesome because the
importance of specific nonpoint characteristics is unclear.  Recent studies have begun to rectify this problem.
For instance, several studies indicate that it is important to design instruments to account for heterogeneity
(e.g., Carpentier, Bosch, and Batie, 1998; Flemming and Adams, 1997; Claassen and Horan, forthcoming;
Horan et al., 1999), although this finding is not applicable to all situations (Helfand and House, 1995).
Indeed, since individual studies typically only focus on a particular water quality problem in a particular
geographical area, the robustness of any results pertaining to the importance of nonpoint features is a
concern.
The highly stochastic nature of nonpoint pollution is of particular interest (Braden and Segerson,
1993; Shortle and Abler, 1997).  One implication of stochastic pollution is that the economic benefits of
pollution control are also stochastic.  If these benefits depend nonlinearly on emissions, then a degree of
(environmental) risk is associated with production and pollution control choices.
2  We use the term risk to
indicate that there are economic benefits to controlling moments of the distributions of environmental and
economic outcomes other than just mean emissions.  Thus, we distinguish between risk and the level of
stochasticity.  Risk depends on both the level of stochasticity and the economic value associated with
stochasticity.
Risk is important to the extent that it influences optimal policy design and related outcomes.  Indeed,2
stochastic processes are potentially important in determining the relative efficiency of policy instruments,
as some instruments account for risk better than others (Shortle, Horan, and Abler,  1998; Horan et al., 1999).
For example, input-based instruments can be designed efficiently to account for the risk-effects created by
the use of each input.  In contrast, instruments based on mean emissions cannot account for all of these risk-
effects, and hence cannot be efficient (Shortle, Horan, and Abler, 1998; Shortle and Dunn, 1986).
Relatively few empirical studies have actually modeled stochastic pollution in a meaningful way
(e.g., McSweeny and Shortle, 1990; Mapp et al., 1994; Teague, Bernardo, and Mapp, 1995).  Instead, most
studies are either based on a deterministic specification or only consider policy goals that limit mean
environmental impacts, such as mean emissions or a linear aggregation thereof, and do not account for other
distributional moments (of environmental impacts) that may have important economic implications (e.g.,
Helfand and House, 1995; Larson, Helfand, and House, 1996; Litner and Weersink, 1999; Moxey and White,
1994; Flemming and Adams, 1997; Huang, Shank, and Hewitt, 1996; Hopkins, Schitkey, and Tweeten, 1996;
Taylor, Adams, and Miller, 1992; Yiridoe and Weersink, 1998; Carpentier Bosch, and Batie, 1998; Claassen
and Horan, forthcoming).
3  In contrast, many actual policies focus on distributional moments other than the
mean.  Examples include treatment requirements for drinking water or capacity regulations for manure
storage, both of which are highly attuned to low probability events (e.g., low levels of pathogens in drinking
water or a 100 year flood) that have significant health and/or economic impacts (U.S. EPA, 1993; Ohanian,
1992).  Hence, empirical studies that do not consider distrubutional moments other than the mean may
provide insufficient or even misleading input to the policymaking process.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the economic consequences of not accounting for
stochastic processes when designing and comparing alternative nonpoint pollution control instruments.  This
important question remains largely unanswered in the literature.
4  We begin with a conceptual model to
illustrate the issues involved.  Next, a simulation is developed to compare the environmental and economic
impacts of various instruments when designed under deterministic and stochastic specifications for nonpoint
processes.  The simulation is constructed as an experiment to determine potential impacts under a wide
variety of situations.
A Model of Nonpoint Pollution
Following Shortle, Horan, and Abler (1998), assume a particular resource (e.g., a lake) is damaged
by a single residual (e.g., nitrogen).  Economic damages, D, are an increasing function of the ambient
concentration of the residual, a, i.e., D=D(a),  .  Ambient pollution depends on emissions from D )>0
nonpoint sources, ri (i = 1, 2,..., n), natural generation of the pollutant, .,  stochastic environmental variables3
that influence transport and fate, *, and watershed characteristics and parameters, R, i.e.,
  .  Nonpoint emissions cannot be observed directly (at least a ’ a(r1, r2,..., rn, ., *, R) (Ma/Mri $ 0 ￿i)
not at an acceptable cost) and, via stochastic variations in environmental drivers (e.g., weather), are
stochastic.  Accordingly, nonpoint sources can only influence the distribution of their emissions.  Emissions
depend on an (mx1) vector of variable inputs,  xi, site-specific, stochastic environmental variables,  vi, and
site characteristics (e.g., soil type and topography), "i .  The relationship for site i is  . ri ’ ri(xi, vi, "i)
Risk and Instrument Design
Throughout this paper, we analyze instruments designed to maximize the expected net social benefits
from production.
5  Assuming firms are price-takers operating in undistorted, competitive markets, the
expected social net benefits from production are defined as consumers’ surplus, plus firm quasi-rents, plus
any rents that accrue to factors of production not supplied at constant cost to the industry, minus the expected
damages from pollution.  
First-best input taxes
To see how risk may be important, consider a set of firm-specific taxes applied to each input that
influences emissions.  The efficient (first-best) tax rates applied to risk-neutral, profit-maximizing firms are
of the form (Shortle, Horan, and Abler, 1998)





















where   is the tax applied to the jth input of the ith firm, and where the superscript * indicates that the RHS Jij
expression is evaluated at the ex ante efficient solution.  The optimal tax rate for input j for firm i equals
expected marginal damages, times the expected marginal increase in ambient pollution levels from firm i’s
emissions, times the expected increase in emissions from increased use of input j at the margin, plus two
covariance terms that act as risk premiums or rewards, depending on the signs.  The tax rate may be positive
or negative depending on the signs and relative magnitudes of the three RHS terms in equation (1).  
The sign of the first RHS term will be positive for pollution-increasing inputs and negative for
pollution-decreasing inputs.  The signs of the risk terms are ambiguous without further specification.   If a
is convex in runoff, then the first covariance term is of the same sign as  .  Thus, when a is MVar(r
(
i )/Mxij
convex, risk and hence   are increased when an increase in the use of the input increases the variance of Jij4
runoff.
6  Similarly, when  , risk and hence   are increased when an increase in the use of the input D )) > 0 Jij
increases the variance of a.  However, if a is concave in runoff and/or if  , then increases in the D )) < 0
variance of runoff and/or ambient pollution have the opposite effect on  .  Greater variability of Jij
environmental outcomes would be socially beneficial in such cases, which are quite plausible.  Ecosystem
health and associated economic impacts may be realistically modeled by “S” shaped impact functions which
have both convex and concave segments (Hershaft et al., 1978).  In any case, the first risk term is generally
nonzero when ambient pollution is a nonlinear function of emissions, while the second risk term is generally
nonzero when damages are a nonlinear function of ambient pollution.
The risk terms are clearly important to the extent that they affect instrument levels and have
economic consequences.  Accordingly, policy prescriptions could be subject to significant error if instrument
levels are derived from a deterministic model (a mis-specified model in which the distributions of all random
variables are ignored) when, in reality, pollution is stochastic and risk is important.  This can be seen by
comparison of (1) to tax rates derived from a mis-specified model, which are of the form
(2) J
)







where the supercript ** denotes that the RHS expression is evaluated at the optimal solution from the mis-
specified model.  
The tax rates defined in (2) differ from those in (1) in three respects.  First, there are no expectations
operators in (2) since the mis-specified model is deterministic.  Thus, other things being equal, the first RHS
term in (1) will differ from the RHS of (2).  Analytically, the sign of this difference is ambiguous and
depends on the distributions of the random variables and how they enter into environmental relations and
marginal damages.  Consider the marginal damage term as an example.  Only the means of random variables
will matter if marginal damages are a linear function of the random variables, whereas the means, variances,
and covariances of the random variables will matter if marginal damages are a quadratic function of the
random variables.  Failure to account for these moments can therefore affect the level of the tax and,
accordingly, input use by firms -- even those inputs that have no risk-effects.  Other things being equal, a
positive (negative) difference between the first RHS term in (1) and the RHS of (2) indicates that taxes
derived from the mis-specified model will be too low (high) and will not fully transmit the costs (benefits)
that this term represents.
A second difference is that there are no risk terms in (2).  The tax rate   therefore does not account J
)
ij
for social costs stemming from environmental risk.  The implication is that more risk will result in larger5
taxes and smaller subsidies in (1) than in (2), other things being equal, and thus the allocation of pollution
control efforts across input choices and individual firms will differ between the two models.  There will be
incentives under the mis-specified model for firms to use risk-increasing inputs at inefficiently high levels
and to under-employ risk-reducing inputs.  Additionally, firms with greater contributions to environmental
risk at the margin will face incentives to adopt inefficiently lax pollution controls while firms with smaller
risk contributions will face incentives to adopt inefficiently stringent controls when the mis-specified model
is applied.  The differences in the pollution control allocations that arise from the two models may have
important implications for the allocation of economic gains and losses to those with an economic interest in
pollution control. 
A final point of comparison is that the allocations at which (1) and (2) are evaluated will differ.  The
quantitative implications of this difference are generally ambiguous without further specification.  As an
example, suppose pollution-increasing and risk-increasing inputs are positively correlated and that damages
and all environmental relations are convex.  With risk-increasing inputs being used in larger quantities under
(2) (due to the lack of risk-terms), marginal damages and marginal environmental impacts will be larger.  The
effect is a larger tax in (2), somewhat offsetting the lower tax rates that result when there are no risk-terms.
Other specifications may exacerbate differences in tax rates.  Generally, differences between (1) and (2)
depend on the specification of the model, with the shape of the damage, ambient, and emissions functions,
as well as substitution, output, and price effects being particularly important.
Second-best instruments
Similar comparisons can be made for second-best instruments.  The form of second-best input taxes
that are applied uniformly across producers (when a differentiated structure is preferred) to only a subset of
inputs that affect emissions, and the form of second-best, uniformly applied taxes based on expected
emissions are derived in Shortle, Horan, and Abler (1998) and Horan et al. (1999) and are presented in Table
1 for both the correctly-specified and mis-specified models.
7  In each case, the single correct tax rate depends
on covariance terms involving all producers and all inputs, whereas a first-best tax rate depends only on
convariances involving a single input used by a single producer.  These additional covariances, which occur
because the instruments are not differentiated across producers and their input use, represent additional
sources of divergence between the correctly-specified and mis-specified models, relative to the first-best
case.
Deterministic modeling efforts can affect the (perceived and actual) relative economic performance
of alternative instruments in addition to their absolute performance.  For example, ambient taxes and taxes6
based on mean emissions may appear to be first-best under a deterministic specification, but they can only
be second-best in a stochastic setting (Horan, Shortle, and Abler, 1998; Shortle and Dunn, 1986).  This is
because instruments based on mean environmental performance do not adequately provide incentives for
firms to consider how their choices impact the variance and higher moments of the distribution of
environmental outcomes.
A Simulation Model
Little can be said analytically about how the design of different instruments and their associated
economic consequences might be affected by deterministic modeling when pollution is stochastic.  However,
we should be able to say something of policy relevance by specifying the model in a realistic fashion.
Therefore, to gain further insight, we  have developed a simulation experiment involving one thousand
independent, hypothetical watersheds.  The use of hypothetical watersheds permits complete control over
the design of the experiment and, by comparison to one or a small number of case studies of actual
watersheds, increases our ability to investigate these issues for a variety of conditions.  Although the
watersheds are hypothetical, significant effort was taken to ensure the relationships are representative of
more realistic settings, particularly those involving agricultural sources -- the most important source of
remaining water quality problems in the U.S. (USDA and USEPA, 1998).
The simulation model has the same general structure as standard conceptual models of agricultural
nonpoint pollution (e.g., Shortle and Dunn, 1986; Shortle, Horan, and Abler, 1998).  Specifically, each
watershed contains four nonpoint sources, where each source essentially represents classes of producers that
vary according to cost structure and environmental impacts.  These variations are taken to occur at the sub-
watershed level, so that each source represents aggregate production within a region.  Producers in each
region operate in competitive markets, taking prices as given, although the commodity (corn) price is
endogenous to the watershed and land prices are endogenous to each region.
8  Production is a two-level CES
function of a composite ‘biological’ input (land and fertilizer) and a composite ‘mechanical’ input (capital
and labor).   Details of production and input and output markets are provided in the appendix.
Nonpoint emissions (runoff) per acre are influenced by excess fertilizer use (i.e., fertilizer not taken
up by the crop) per acre as well as a stochastic, weather related term.  Specifically, farm i’s runoff per
acre,  (where   is land), is a second-order approximation of actual per acre runoff, which is taken to ri/xi1 xi1
be an increasing, convex function of excess fertilizer use per acre,  , i.e,  , where gi ri/xi1’b1igi%b2ig
2
i %vigi
,    is excess fertilizer, and   is a random variable with zero mean.  The specification for the gi’xi2/xi1 xi2 vi
random term is consistent with that of Just and Pope (1978).  In particular, a larger value of  (due to either gi7
more fertilizer or less land) results in a larger mean and variance of  . ri/xi1
Runoff from each source is transported to a water body according to a stochastic (due to weather)
process, although only a fraction of the runoff generated at each site becomes part of the ambient pollution
concentration in the water body.  The proportion of the runoff that is transported is modeled as a constant
transport coefficient,  .  In aggregate, pollution transport and the resulting ambient pollution levels are ji
reasonably represented by a first-order approximation (Roth and Jury, 1993) based on the sum of the




deterministic parameter, and * is a random variable with zero mean.  Thus, more loadings result in a greater
mean and variance of a.  Finally, the resulting ambient pollution concentration creates economic damages,
denoted D.  Economic damages are a second-order approximation of actual damages, which is taken to be
an increasing, convex function of a, i.e.,   . D ’ d1a%d2a 2
More details of the model and data used for calibration are provided in the appendix.  In particular,
the elasticities and other parameters used to calibrate the model are drawn from a literature that reports a
range of values.  This parameter uncertainty is dealt with through a Monte Carlo (sensitivity) analysis in
which the uncertain values are randomly distributed.  Each of the one thousand watersheds in the model is
developed from a single draw of all uncertain parameter values, and the results from each watershed are used
to form a distribution of results.  More details of this procedure are also provided in the appendix.  However,
note the distinction between parameter uncertainty and stochastic variables.  In each draw, parameters are
treated as deterministic while stochastic variables remain stochastic.
We obtain results for four alternative schemes to reduce nutrient runoff: efficient input taxes (defined
by firm-specific taxes applied to fertilizer and land), uniform fertilizer taxes, firm-specific taxes based on
mean runoff, and uniform mean runoff taxes.  These schemes have real world analogues.  Measures to
regulate fertilizer use, primarily in the form of fertilizer quotas or taxes, are a common feature of policy
proposals to reduce nutrient pollution, and have been implemented in some states in the U.S. and Europe
(Leuk, 1994; Ribaudo, 1998).  Crop land retirement, in the form of the Conservation Reserve Program, is
a major approach to agricultural nonpoint pollution control in the U.S. (USDA-ERS, 1997).  
For each scheme, first- or second-best instruments and associated welfare measures are determined
taking all stochastic components into consideration (the correct model).  Values of all instruments and
associated welfare measures are also determined optimally under an incorrect, deterministic specification
in which all random variables are evaluated at their means (the perceived results of the mis-specified model).
In addition, the actual distributions of environmental and economic results (i.e., taking the stochastic nature
of pollution into consideration) are determined given the values of the instruments derived using the mis-8
specified model (the actual results of the mis-specified model).  (The model is constructed so that the
perceived and actual results of the mis-specified model will only differ with respect to expected damages and
hence expected social net benefits).  Large differences in results from the correctly specified and mis-
specified models indicate the need for a stochastic specification, while small differences suggest a
deterministic specification may be adequate.
Obviously, the specification of stochastic processes and risk may have an important impact on
results.
9  To ameliorate any potential biases due to model construction, the stochastic processes and risk
components have been specified quite simplistically (although realistically).  Ambient pollution is a linear
function of the random components, each of which is independently distributed.  Consequently, the quadratic
damage term is the only source of risk in the model (e.g., the first covariance term on the RHS of (1)
vanishes) given the linear and independent specification of stochastic terms.  The Monte Carlo analysis also
helps to alleviate any bias due to model construction by providing results for a range of risk components and
distributions of stochastic variables.  This allows us to compare results from watersheds with little variability
in stochastic components and little risk with results from watersheds in which these stochastic and risk




We begin by comparing, for each policy scenario, the optimal tax rates derived in the correctly
specified model (the correct tax rates) with those derived in the mis-specified model (the incorrect tax rates).
The results are expressed in Table 2 as the percentage difference between the correct and incorrect tax rates
(i.e., 100(correct tax - incorrect tax)/correct tax).
First, consider the input tax scenarios.  The efficient and uniform fertilizer tax results are similar,
with the correct fertilizer tax rates being larger than the incorrect tax rates in all samples.  Specifically, the
difference between correct and incorrect tax rates range from 0.12% (in the case of very little risk) to 84%
(in the case of substantial risk), with a sample average difference of 30% to 37%.  The incorrect tax rates are
smaller in each case because fertilizer is a risk-increasing input and, as described above, there are incentives
under the mis-specified model for farms to use risk-increasing inputs at inefficiently high levels.  Note that
the difference between correct and incorrect tax rates is proportionately larger in Regions 1 and 3, which are
greater contributors to risk due to the greater proportion of runoff that is transported from these regions.
Also, on average, the difference in correct and incorrect tax rates are proportionately smaller in Region 4 than
in Region 2, which contributes more to risk since fertilizer is used more intensively in this region.9
For the case of efficient land subsidies, the correct subsidies are 34% larger than incorrect subsidies
in Region 1 and 10.5% larger than incorrect subsidies in Region 3, on average.  The range of differences in
these regions is large, however, extending from -50% to 248%.  Positive differences generally occur in
Regions 1 and 3 because land is a risk-reducing input (in terms of its impact on the variance of ambient
pollution), and so there will be marginal incentives under the mis-specified model for farms in these regions
to under-employ land (i.e., smaller subsidies).  However, the larger fertilizer taxes in these regions under the
correct model result in proportionately larger output effects and hence proportionately smaller derived
demands for land.  The net effect is that less land is employed in Regions 1 and 3 under the correct model
than in the mis-specified model.  In contrast, the correct subsidies are 26% smaller than incorrect subsidies
in Region 2 and 27% smaller than incorrect subsidies in Region 4, on average.  The range of differences in
these regions is also large (but smaller than that of Regions 1 and 3), extending from –80% to 25%.  Negative
differences generally occur in Regions 2 and 4.  This is because the larger output effects in Regions 1 and
3 under the correct model drive up the output price, resulting in proportionately larger increases in the
dervied demand for land in Regions 2 and 4 under the correct model.  Thus, less of a subsidy is required than
in the mis-specified model.
Now consider the expected runoff tax scenarios.  The expected runoff tax encourages farms to
substitute land for fertilizer, and also to reduce output and hence the use of both of these inputs.  Reducing
fertilizer use and/or increasing land use reduce risk; however, the incorrect model does not take these
additional benefits into account (even in the correct model, these risk-impacts cannot both be efficiently
managed using an expected runoff tax (Shortle and Dunn, 1986)).  Accordingly, for almost every sample,
fertilizer use and land use are too high in Regions 1 and 3 (which have the greatest risk-impacts due to larger
transport coefficients) in the mis-specified model, with a net effect of too much risk due to greater fertilizer
use.  These input use decisions correspond to smaller incorrect taxes relative to the correct taxes.
Specifically, the difference between correct and incorrect tax rates in these regions range from 0.16% to 89%,
with sample average differences of 39.5% and 38%.  Greater fertilizer use and land use in the mis-specified
model are accompanied by more output and a smaller output price, reducing the derived demand for land and
fertilizer in Regions 2 and 4.  This also results in smaller incorrect taxes relative to correct taxes for the vast
majority of the samples, although with less fertilizer and land (and hence output) due to the smaller output
price.  However, these smaller taxes are not reflected in Table 2 as the incorrect taxes are substantially larger
than the correct taxes on average.  These large mean differences occur in a small percentage of samples in
which the correct taxes for Regions 2 and 4 are essentially zero due to the small contribution these regions
make towards ambient pollution and also risk, while the taxes for Regions 1 and 3 are large due to their10
significant risk contributions in these samples.  Thus, any percentage change from the correct taxes in
Regions 2 and 4 in these cases will necessarily be large enough to bias the entire distribution of results.  As
it happens, the incorrect tax rates are actually slightly positive in these limited samples, primarily because
pollution control is reallocated from Regions 1 and 3 since the mis-specified model does not recognize their
contribution to risk (and thus the mean contributions of Regions 2 and 4 towards ambient pollution are seen
as more important).  Thus, farmers who would not optimally bear pollution control costs are subjected to
taxes when risk is not considered.
Welfare levels
We now compare welfare levels resulting from the correctly specified model (correct welfare) with
those resulting from the mis-specified model (incorrect welfare, i.e., actual welfare, as measured by the
correct model, based on producer responses to the taxes derived in the incorrect model).  We do this in two
ways.  First, for each policy scenario, we compare correct and incorrect welfare directly (Table 3), as well
as incorrect welfare and the perceived welfare that results under the mis-specified model (perceived welfare,
i.e., welfare predicted by the mis-specified model) (Table 4).  Second, we compare the relative (perceived)
performance of the various policy approaches under the two models, where performance is measured in terms
of the various welfare measures (Table 5).
Differences in absolute performance (actual and perceived).  First, consider a direct comparison
of correct and incorrect welfare.  The results are expressed in Table 3 as percentage differences from the
correct welfare measures.  As is required, the correct model results in larger expected net social benefits,
although these benefits do not differ much between the correct and mis-specified models.  Even in samples
in which risk is significant, the differences are only moderate at around 8% for all instruments.  However,
differences in the welfare accruing to different groups with an interest in production are significant in most
cases.  Differences in incorrect and perceived welfare (Table 4, where the results are expressed as percentage
differences from the incorrect welfare measures) follow an opposite pattern.  The incorrect model
consistently overestimates expected social net benefits, by as much as 22% in some samples.  These
differences are due to inaccurate estimates for expected damages, which are discussed below.
Consumers’ surplus is smaller under the correct model for all samples, indicating that optimally
managing risk results in an output reduction (Table 3).  The reductions in consumers’ surplus range from
minuscule in samples with minimal risk to almost 40% in samples with significant risk, with an average
reduction of about 6% for differentiated policy instruments to more than 11% for uniform instruments.  Since
consumers’ surplus is unaffected by risk, there are no perceived differences from actual results. 11
The biggest differences in welfare occur with respect to expected damages (Table 3).  Expected
damages are smaller under the correct model for all samples, indicating a significant welfare improvement
from accounting for risk.  The reductions in expected damages range from almost nothing in samples with
minimal risk to almost 386% in samples with significant risk, with an average reduction of about 71% for
differentiated policy instruments to about 55% for uniform instruments.  Differences in incorrect and
perceived damages (Table 4) follow an opposite, although less pronounced, pattern.  The mis-specified model
consistently underestimates expected damages by 41% to 44% on average across samples, and by as much
as 91% in some samples, due to the fact that the mis-specified model does not value risk. 
Finally, consider the differences in landowners’ surplus under the correct and mis-specified models
(Table 3).  In aggregate, the differences are generally small on average, with moderate positive or negative
differences occurring in some samples.  However, differences in the returns to landowners in particular
regions may be quite large, even on average.  As with consumers’ surplus, there are no perceived differences
from actual results since landowners’ surplus is unaffected by risk.
Differences in perceived relative performance.  Now consider the relative (perceived) performance
of the various policy approaches under the two models, where performance is measured in terms of the
various welfare measures (Table 5).  In the correct model, for example, efficient taxes always result in greater
expected social net benefits, greater consumers’ surplus, and smaller expected damages than any of the other
policy scenarios, and generally result in greater landowners’ surplus than any of the other scenarios (except
for the uniform expected runoff tax).  In contrast, the mis-specified model predicts that the welfare impacts
of efficient taxes are equivalent to those of non-uniform expected runoff taxes, and overpredicts the number
of samples for which the efficient tax produces greater landowners’ surplus than the uniform fertilizer tax
and the uniform expected runoff tax.  However, incorrect predictions are not necessarily a problem unless
the welfare measures being compared are significantly different from each other.  For example, mean social
net benefits under efficient taxes are only 0.01% larger than those under a non-uniform expected runoff tax,
and similar mean differences with respect to the other welfare measures are also less than 1% in this case.
Thus, it matters little whether efficient taxes or non-uniform runoff taxes are applied, which is interesting
because much has been made of the fact that non-uniform expected runoff taxes are inefficient due to their
inability to account for risk (Shortle and Dunn, 1986).
10  However, differences in landowners’ surplus are
almost 3% larger in Region 1 and 1.5% larger in Region 3 on average (and larger in many other cases) under
non-uniform taxes (not reported in Table 5), which may be significant in monetary terms.
For comparisons involving other combinations of instruments, the mis-specified model generally
makes accurate comparisons on the basis of expected social net benefits, consumers’ surplus, and expected12
damages.  The only significant exceptions are for consumer’s surplus and expected damages for comparisons
involving uniform fertilizer taxes and uniform expected runoff taxes.  The mis-specified model has more
difficulty when comparing landowners’ surplus, particularly when broken down by region.
Extreme events
Finally, accounting for environmental risk is important in terms of how policy instruments influence
the probability of extreme events.  Our particular concern lies with the probability of unwanted extreme
events, such as excessive runoff and associated levels of ambient pollution and economic damages.  A point
of reference is needed to define an extreme event.  Therefore, for each policy scenario and for each
environmental performance measure, we define an extreme event as one in which the performance measure
takes on a value in excess of two standard deviations above the mean, where the relevant mean and standard
deviation are those resulting in an optimal solution using the correct model.  For example, consider a uniform
fertilizer tax.  First, the optimal tax is derived in both the correct and mis-specified models.  Next, the mean
and standard deviation of each performance measure (runoff, ambient pollution, and damages) is calculated
given the production choices resulting from the correct tax.  These statistics are used to determine extreme
values as described above.  Finally, the probability of exceeding these values is calculated and compared for
the uniform fertilizer taxes in the correct and incorrect models.  
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 6.  For simplicity, a Monte Carlo approach was
not used in deriving these results.  Instead, mean values were used for all uncertain parameter values.  The
associated extreme critical values for each policy are as follows: runoff critical values are on average 116%
larger than mean runoff in each region, ambient pollution critical values are on average 139% larger than
mean ambient pollution, and damage critical values are on average 196% larger than mean damages.
Table 6 clearly shows that the probability of extreme events is larger when the mis-specified model
is applied.  This is expected.  However, the differences in the probabilities associated with extreme events
is substantial, differing by a factor of three or four for the case of ambient pollution, and a factor of three for
damages.  Thus, policy measures that do rely on risk information are much less likely to result in severe
environmental outcomes, such as a massive fish kill due to nutrient over-enrichment, than policy measures
that take this information into account.
Conclusion
Frequently, policy regarding the control of pollution or of natural events, such as floods, focuses on
reducing the risk of the extreme events.  This focus is natural: mean levels of these events may affect more13
people more of the time, but of greater political concern are relatively rare extreme events, which may affect
only a few people, but in catastrophic ways.  An example is a pathogenic outbreak in a local water supply.
Large sums of money are expended to protect drinking water from such occurrences.  The political costs of
an outbreak can be high, particularly when children or the elderly become ill and/or die as a result.  An
economic model that acknowledges only mean water quality events will not capture the range of possible
welfare impacts.  Hence, a model that does not consider the stochastic aspects of physical processes, as is
the case for most existing, economic models for the control of  pollution or other natural events, will be less
than satisfactory for policymaking purposes.  Furthermore, even the mean welfare impacts estimated by these
models may be incorrect. 
This paper examines the implications of explicitly considering the stochastic nature of environmental
processes when developing nonpoint pollution control policies.  We find that even with a quite simplistic
specification for risk, several important results arise from this analysis.  First, risk has important impacts on
the magnitudes of policy instruments.  Second, the impacts of risk on expected net benefits are relatively
small, while the impacts of risk on the allocation of welfare are relatively large in many cases.  This result
is significant for policymaking purposes, given that the allocation of welfare may be of more importance than
the aggregate welfare level.  Third, the perceived welfare calculated from a mis-specified model differs
significantly from actual welfare levels that result when using policy choices derived from the mis-specified
model.  Thus, the actual impacts of a policy are likely to differ significantly from the predictions of naive,
deterministic models.  Somewhat surprisingly, these  incorrect perceptions actually result in the mis-specified
model and the correct model yielding almost identical comparisons of the relative performance of various
first-best and second-best instruments, although the mis-specified model does not always make accurate
comparisons regarding the returns to consumers and landowners under the various policy approaches.
Finally, we find that deriving optimal policy instrument levels using risk-based models significantly reduces
the probability of unwanted, extreme events such as excessive pollution and damage levels.
Appendix
The simulation model closely follows that of Claassen and Horan (Forthcoming).  In each watershed,
four nonpoint sources produce a single, identical agricultural commodity (corn) according to a constant
returns to scale, two-level CES technology (Sato, 1967).  Corn production depends on a composite biological
input and a composite mechanical input.  The biological input is produced using land and fertilizer according14
to a constant returns to scale CES technology.  The mechanical input depends on labor and capital, but is not
decomposed into these inputs because labor and capital prices are held fixed and hence labor and capital are
used in constant proportions.  Production heterogeneity is created through input cost shares (Table A1), with
farms 1 and 2 using fertilizer more intensively on a per acre basis than farms 3 and 4.  Initial outputs and
costs are identical across farms to reduce the impacts of scale effects among sources since heterogeneity does
not occur along these lines.  Aggregate revenue and costs for this sector equal one.  With all input and output
prices set equal to one initially, output equals revenue and inputs equal factor costs.
Output and land prices are endogenous.  The output market is at the watershed level and output
demand is modeled as a first-order approximation of actual demand.  In contrast, land supply takes a constant
elasticity form and is defined for each source (i.e., if each source represents aggregate production in a region
of the watershed, then land supply is defined at the regional level).
On the environmental side, runoff, ambient pollution, and damage functions are desribed in the text.
Environmental heterogeneity is created by farms 1 and 3 having larger initial average runoff per acre (i.e.,
) on average (Table A1; see also discussion of Monte Carlo analysis below).  Transport ri/(xi1gi)
coefficients represent another important source of environmental heterogeneity as farms 1 and 3 on average
have higher transport coefficients than other farms (Table A1; see also discussion of Monte Carlo analysis
below).  Mean ambient pollution equals one initially.  Finally, economic damages from pollution is calibrated
by setting initial expected damages equal to 20% of initial net benefits (similar to an upper bound reported
by Smith (1992) for groundwater damages) and by choosing an elasticity of expected damages (Table A1).
The impacts of stochastic environmental terms are modeled using a Gaussian Quadrature to provide
an exact measure of expected damages and related terms (Miller and Rice, 1983; Preckel and DeVuyst,
1992).  Since   and a are linear in the random variables and damages are quadratic, each random variable ri
only needs to be evaluated at two points to provide an exact measure of all relevant expected values (Miller
and Rice, 1983).  The joint distribution for the five random variables therefore consists of 32 points.
A number of elasticities and other parameters are needed to calibrate the model.  However, the
literature reports a range of values.  To deal with this parameter uncertainty, we follow Abler and Shortle
(1995) and Davis and Espinoza (1998) and perform a Monte Carlo (sensitivity) analysis to obtain a
distribution of ex post results.
11  Specifically, the model is solved one thousand times, taking many parameter
values as randomly and independently distributed.  Each iteration represents a single draw of all uncertain
parameter values and, at each iteration, parameter values are assumed known with certainty.  In effect, each
iteration represents an individual watershed.  Uncertain parameter values are all assumed to be uniformly
distributed according to reasonable bounds suggested by the literature.  The parameters and their distributions15
are also reported in Table A1.  Source-specific values are allowed to differ at each iteration, although source-
specific values of a particular parameter are all taken from the same distributions (unless specified
otherwise).  The sample size of one thousand is large enough to obtain fairly tight confidence intervals
around the sample expected net benefits for each scheme.16
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Table 1.  Second-Best Taxes Derived Under Correct and Mis-Specified Models
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 the (1x(m-mN)) vector of untaxed inputs.
Note: Superscripts #, ##, ^, and ^^ denote the variables are evaluated at their optimal value given the specification of the model and instruments being used.Table 2.  Percent Differences Between Optimal Tax Rates 
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Efficient Fertilizer

































































aSample mean of percent differences: 100(correct tax - incorrect tax)/correct tax.
bSample standard deviation of percent differences.
cSample range of percent differences.Table 3.  Percent Differences between Actual Welfare 
from Correctly Specified Model and Actual Welfare from Mis-Specified Model






















































































































 aSample mean of percent differences: 100(correct welfare - incorrect welfare)/correct welfare.
bSample standard deviation of percent differences.
cSample range of percent differences.Table 4.  Percent Differences between Actual Welfare 
from Mis-Specified Model and Perceived Welfare from Mis-Specified Model










































aSample mean of percent differences: 100(actual welfare - perceived welfare)/actual welfare.
bSample standard deviation of percent differences.
cSample range of percent differences.Table 5.  Comparison of Instruments in Correctly Specified Models and in Mis-Specified Models, and Number of Mistakes from Using Mis-Specified Models
Policy
Instruments
Welfare Measure Percent of Samples in which Row Instruments Outperform Column Instruments (by welfare measure)















b 100 Equivalent (100) [0.01] 100 100 (0) ----
Consumers’ Surplus 100 100 (0) ---- 100 Equivalent (100) [-0.04] 100 99.6 (0.4) [8.84]
Expected Damages 100 100 (0) ---- 80.4 Equivalent (100) [-0.01] 100 100 (0) ----





---- ---- ---- ---- 0 0 (0) ---- 6.4 6.4 (1.6) [-0.25]
Consumers’ Surplus ---- ---- ---- ---- 0 0 (0) ---- 98 3.6 (3.2) [-2.77]
Expected Damages ---- ---- ---- ---- 0 0 (0) ---- 8.2 7 (2.8) [-1.56]






---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 100 100 (0) ----
Consumers’ Surplus ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 100 99.6 (0.4) [9.0]
Expected Damages ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 100 100 (0) ----
Landowners’ Surplus ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 8.8 8.6 (2.2) [-0.12]
Notes:  
aPercent of samples in which mis-specified model predicts relative performance incorrectly.  
bSample mean of actual percentage differences in welfare from the use of row versus column instruments, computed using correct model and for only those





































0.00 0.31 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.3 0.00 0.17
Prob(Region 2's runoff >
two standard deviations
above the mean)
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.12
Prob(Region 3's runoff >
two standard deviations
above the mean)
0.00 0.17 0.00 0.07 0.00  0.17 0.00 0.1
Prob(Region 4's runoff >
two standard deviations
above the mean)








0.05 0.16 0.05 0.15  0.06 0.17 0.05 0.15
Notes:
aResults are calculated with uncertain parameter values evaluated at their mean values.
bMeans and standard deviations are calculated from the correctly specified model, given the policy instruments




Region 1 0.25 0.35 0.4
Region 2 .025 0.35 0.4
Region 3 0.4 0.2 0.4
Region 4 0.4 0.2 0.4
Uncertain Parameters Distribution Mean Variance Sources and/or Justification for Parameter Ranges
Elasticity of demand U(-1.2, -0.45) -0.825 0.0469 Consistent with the domestic elasticity of demand for corn
in the Corn Belt and Lake States.  See Claassen and Horan
(forthcoming) for derivation.
Elasticity of land supply U(0.15, 0.45) 0.3 0.0075 Chavas and Holt (1990); Holt (1990); Lee and





U(0.1, 0.9) 0.5 0.0533 Binswanger, (1974); Chambers and Vasavada, (1983);
Fernandez-Cornejo, (1992); Hertel, (1989); Kawagoe,




U(1.1, 1.4) 1.25 0.025 Binswanger, (1974); Chambers and Vasavada, (1983);
Fernandez-Cornejo, (1992); Hertel, (1989); Kawagoe,
Otsuka, and Hayami, (1985); Ray, (1982); Thirtle, (1985)
Average per acre runoff:
     Farms 1 and 3







NRC, (1993); Peterson and Frye, (1989); Smith, Schwarz,
and Alexander, (1997)
Uptake U(0.6, 0.8) 0.7 0.0033 Keeney, (1982); Peterson and Frye (1989), NRC (1993)
Elasticity of per acre
runoff
U(1, 2) 1.5 0.0833 The chosen bounds ensure an increasing, convex function,





U(0.1, 3) 1.55 0.7008 Koutsoyiannia, (1999); Manguerra and Engel, (1998)
Coefficient of variation:
runoff
U(0.1, CVA) 0.825* 0.1752* Koutsoyiannia, (1999); Manguerra and Engel, (1998)
Runoff Transport
     Farms 1 and 3







Fisher et al., (1988); Smith, Schwarz, and Alexander,
(1997)
Elasticity of damages U(1.2, 2) 1.6 0.5333 The chosen bounds ensure an increasing, convex function
Note: Cost shares are consistent with the range of  estimates for corn production in the Corn Belt and Lake States
(Claassen and Horan, forthcoming; USDA-ERS; USDA-ERS, 1990).  *Expected mean and variance based on CVA19
1. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of USDA-
ERS.
2. There are two ways that benefits could be a nonlinear function of emissions: (1) benefits are a
nonlinear function of environmental quality, or (2) environmental quality is a nonlinear function
of emissions. 
3. The degree to which risk is accounted for in these and other studies is not always made clear.
4. A few studies in which instruments are designed to achieve an exogenous environmental
constraint with a given probability do evaluate how instruments and control costs respond to
increases in this probability (McSweeny and Shortle, 1990; Teague, Bernardo, and Mapp, 1995). 
This provides some indication as to the importance of stochastic processes.
5. The alternative to maximizing the net social benefits from production would be to maximize the
net private benefits from production subject to an exogenously defined, probabilistic
environmental constraint (i.e., a cost-effectiveness approach).  We maximize net social benefits
because this approach provides greater insight into the economic merits of modeling risk and
because it eliminates the need to specify the type of constraint (there are many possibilities) and
the level of the constraint.
6. Let f=f(q) ( ), where q=q(h).  Then   is of the same sign as f ), f )) > 0 cov{f )(q),Mq/Mh}
, where this equality follows from:  cov{q,Mq/Mh}’.5(Mvar{q}/Mh) Mvar{q}/Mh’
= .  This result M(E{q 2}&E{q}2)/Mh 2(E{qMq/Mh}&E{q}E{Mq/Mh}) ’ 2cov{q, Mq/Mh}
is used throughout the paper, although with different definitions for f, q, and h.  
7. These taxes are not described here, but are described in detail in Shortle, Horan, and Abler
(1998) and Horan et al. (1999) .  
8. The geography of watersheds are such that they may vary greatly in size and in terms of
economic importance.  We assume a watershed of sufficient size/importance that changes in
aggregate production have market price impacts.  The elasticity of demand is varied across
watersheds to permit a range of price effects.
9. The same stochastic processes affecting environmental outcomes are also likely to influence
production.  In the present model, we model production deterministically to focus on stochastic
environmental processes.  However, it is generally important that these processes be taken into
consideration as well.
10. The non-uniform expected runoff taxes perform very well because the mean and variance of
runoff are positively correlated in the model.  Thus, reducing mean runoff indirectly reduces the
variance of runoff, an important source of risk in the model.  
11. Ex post results describe the expected outcome of a situation in which all parameter values will be
known when policies are designed and implemented, even if many parameter values are
uncertain at present.  In contrast, ex ante results describe the expected outcome of a situation in
Endnotes20
which at least some parameter values remain uncertain even when policies are designed and
implemented.